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et al.: Grand Jury

GRAND JURY
N.Y. CoNsT. art. , § VI:
No person shall be held to ansverfor a capital or othenvise
infamous crine... unless on indictment of a grandjury, except
that a person held for the action of a grandjury upon a charge
for such an offense, other than one punishable by death or lfe
imprisonment, with the consent of the districtattorney, may waive
indictment by grandjury and consent to be prosecuted on an
informationfiled by the district attorney; such waiver shall be
evidenced by written instrument signed by the defendant in open
court in the presence of his counsel.
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
FIRST DEPARTMENT
People v. Jones1
(decided November 15, 1994)
The defendant claimed that her second degree murder
conviction violated her right under the New York State
Constitution, article I, section 6,2 which guards against
conviction of a capital or "infamous" crime without a valid
indictment by a grand jury. 3 The Appellate Division, First

1. 206 A.D.2d 82, 618 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Ist Dep't 1994).
2. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. Section 6 provides in pertinent part: "No
person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous
crime... unless on indictment of a grand jury...

."

Id.

3. Jones, 206 A.D.2d at 83, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 320. The court noted that
the right to a grand jury indictment stems solely from the New York State
Constitution, as the similar provision set forth in the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution is not applicable to the states. Jones, 206 A.D.2d at
85 n.1, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 322 nl. See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493. 496
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Department, held that where a second grand jury renders a vote
of "no true bill" to the People's re-presentment of criminal
charges embodied in an earlier indictment, the second grand jury
vote constitutes a "legal impediment." 4 Thus, the court rejected
the People's argument that the second grand jury proceeding
should be declared null and void in favor of the first indictment
and reversed the defendant's second degree murder conviction. 5
Defendant was indicted by a grand jury on December 5, 1990,
for felony murder and attempted robbery in both the first and
second degrees for the shooting of a man during an argument
over money. 6 Ten months after the first indictment proceeding,
the People re-presented the case to a new grand jury in order to
add an additional count of first degree burglary. 7 When the
People re-presented the case to the second grand jury, the People
included, in addition to the new first degree burglary count, all of
the counts that were in the first indictment. 8 Following the
second grand jury proceeding, the grand jury voted "no true bill"
to all of the counts in the indictment, including the counts where
the first grand jury moved to indict the defendant. 9 The trial
court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss following the
decision of the second grand jury and the defendant was
subsequently convicted, pursuant to the first indictment, of
second degree murder by a jury trial and sentenced to a prison
term of fifteen years to life. 10
In support of its holding, the court expressly dictated that it had
fundamental authority to dismiss an indictment against a
(1972) (noting that the "Fifth Amendment right to a Grand Jury does not apply
in a state prosecution").
4. Jones, 206 A.D.2d at 87, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 323.
5. Id. at 86-87, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 322-23. A vote of "no true bill" renders
a finding by the grand jury that in their opinion there was insufficient evidence
to warrant a formal charge against the defendant. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY
1047 (6th ed. 1990).
6. Jones, 206 A.D.2d at 84, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 321.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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defendant. 1 1 In coming to this conclusion, the court relied on the

New York Court of Appeals decision in Holtzmran v. Goldman,12
where the court concluded that "[t]rial courts are vested with
statutory power to dismiss indictments, of course, but the power
is not unlimited." 13 This statutory power referred to by the court
of appeals is set forth in New York Criminal Procedure Law
[hereinafter CPL] section 210.20(1).14 The court in Goldman

stated that pretrial dismissals can only be sought in accordance
with CPL section 210.20.15 Similarly, in reaching their decision,
the Jones court relied upon CPL section 210.20(1)(h) and stated
that no other provision within CPL section 210.20(1) was
11. Id.
12. 71 N.Y.2d 564, 523 N.E.2d 297, 528 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1988) (holding
that the trial judge exceeded his powers when he entered a nonappealable order
of dismissal on the merits of a case even though no evidence had been
introduced and the merits of the case had not been heard).
13. Id. at 570, 523 N.E.2d at 301, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 25.
14. N.Y. CRi. PROC. LAW § 210.20(1) (McKinney 1993). The statute
states in pertinent pail:
After arraignment upon an indictment, the superior court may, upon
motion of the defendant, dismiss such indictment or any count thereof
upon the ground that:
(a) Such indictment or count is defective, within the meaning of
section 210.25; or
(b) The evidence before the grand jury was not legally sufficient to
establish the offense charged or any lesser included offense;
or
(c) The grand jury proceeding was defective, within the meaning
of section 210.35; or
(d) The defendant has immunity with respect to the offense
charged, pursuant to section 50.20 or 190.40; or
(e) The prosecution is barred by reason of a previous prosecution,
pursuant to section 40.20; or
(f) The prosecution is untimely, pursuant to section 30.10; or
(g) The defendant has been denied the right to a speedy trial; or
(h) There exists some other jurisdictional or legal impediment to
conviction of the defendant for the offense charged; or
(1) Dismissal is required in the interest of justice, pursuant to
section 210.40.
Id.
I5. Goldman, 71 N.Y.2d at 571-72, 523 N.E.2d at 302, 528 N.Y.S.2d at
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applicable. 16 Thus, the court in Jones explained that a defendant
subject to conviction following a vote of "no true bill" to all
counts in an indictment constituted a true legal impediment which
was binding on the case against the defendant and overrode the
original indictment. 17
The majority's holding was not the first of its kind based on the
factual circumstances presented to the court. In People v.
Franco,18 the Appellate Division, Second Department, faced
with a situation nearly identical to the facts in Jones, held that
CPL section 210.20(1)(h) was applicable to nullify a first
indictment against an individual where a second grand jury votes
"no true bill" to the same charges. 19 The court reasoned that "the

power of the [g]rand [j]ury to decisively abort criminal
proceedings against an individual may not be infringed upon or in
20
any way curtailed."
The Jones court continued with an evaluation of the purpose of
a grand jury proceeding, focusing on the reasoning deduced in
(he New York Court of Appeals decision People v. Iannone.2 1 In

16. Jones, 206 A.D.2d 84-85, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 321. See People v.
Goodman, 31 N.Y.2d 262, 269 n.1, 290 N.E.2d 139, 144 n.1, 338 N.Y.S.2d
97, 104 n. 1 (1972) (stating that Criminal Procedure Law § 210.20(1)(h) is a
"dragnet provision authorizing a motion to dismiss an indictment on the basis
of any 'other jurisdictional or legal impediment to conviction' not mentioned
in the other paragraphs") (citation omitted).
17. Jones, 206 A.D.2d at 85, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 321-22.
18. 196 A.D.2d 357, 612 N.Y.S.2d 591 (2d Dep't 1994) (holding that
where charges are resubmitted to a second grand jury, the subsequent rejection
of those charges nullifies an indictment by a first grand jury and constitutes a
legal impediment).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 45 N.Y.2d 589, 384 N.E.2d 656, 412 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1978) (holding
that a timely objection must be made where there is any objection to the
adequacy of the factual allegations in an indictment which properly charges a
defendant with the commission of a crime). See People v. Lancaster, 69
N.Y.2d 20, 503 N.E.2d 990, 511 N.Y.S.2d 559 (1986) (holding that the
prosecution is not obligated to charge a grand jury with respect to a possible
defense based on mental disease or defect and there is no duty to present
evidence of a defendant's psychiatric history in their possession that could
support such a defense); People v. Ford, 62 N.Y.2d 275, 465 N.E.2d 322,
476 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1984) (holding that unless a defendant makes a timely
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lannone, the court of appeals stated that a grand jury indictment
is "intended to prevent the people of this State from potentially
oppressive excesses by the agents of the government in the
exercise of the prosecutorial authority vested in the State." 22 In
addition, the Iannone cQurt stated that, in order to provide
citizens with protection from public accusation of criminal
wrongdoing and the difficult task of defending oneself from such
a charge, the state is required to persuade a grand jury "that there
exists sufficient evidence and legal reason to believe the accused
guilty." 23 Furthermore, the Jones court cited to CPL
section 190.75(3),24 which requires that where a charge is
dismissed, it may not be resubmitted to a grand jury unless
authorized by the court.2 5 The court relied on the reasoning
established in People v. Cade.2 6 In Cade, the court of appeals
explained that, at common law, the power of the prosecutor to
resubmit charges to the same or new grand jury was unlimited,
and that in order to curtail abuse of this power by prosecutors,
legislative action was necessary. 27 Section 190.75(3) of the CPL

objection, any error by a trial court when considering or submitting to a jury a
lesser crime that arises out of the same criminal act and is not included in the
indictment is waived).
22. Iannone, 45 N.Y.2d at 594, 384-N.E.2d at 660, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 113.
23. Id.
24. N.Y. CraM. PROC. LAW § 190.75(3) (McKinney 1993). The statute
provides in pertinent part:
When a charge has been so dismissed, it may not again be submitted to
a grand jury unless the court in its discretion authorizes or directs the
people to resubmit such charge to the same or another grand jury. If in
such case the charge is again dismissed, it may not again be submitted to
a grand jury.

Id.
25. N.Y. CRlM. PROC. LAW § 190.75(3).
26. 74 N.Y.2d 410, 415, 547 N.E.2d 339, 341, 548 N.Y.S.2d 137, 139
(1989) (holding that where a grand jury votes favorably on charges preferred
against a defendant, the prosecutor is permitted to resubmit the matter to the

same grand jury without having to reintroduce the same evidence or the
prosecutor may resubmit to a new grand jury without the consent of the court
and obtain a superseding indictment).
27. Id. at 414, 547 N.E.2d at 340, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 138.
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was established to approach this concern. 28 Thus, the Jones court
acknowledged that their authority over granting resubmissions is
29
warranted only upon proper cause.
30
The court further focused on the decision of People v. Dykes,
which set forth factors a court may consider when determining
whether to grant a resubmission of charges to a second grand
jury. In Dykes, the court stated that, where a grand jury finds that

evidence presented does not warrant an indictment, there should
not be a resubmission "unless it appears ... that new evidence

has been discovered since the former submission; that the grand
jury failed to give the case a complete and impartial
investigation; or that there is a basis for believing that the grand
jury otherwise acted in an irregular manner." 3 1 After considering
these factors, the authority by a court to grant a resubmission to a
grand jury should be exercised only in limited circumstances in a
discriminate manner. 32 The court, in Jones, acknowledged that
the People failed to delineate any grounds or basis pursuant to
CPL section 190.75(3) to warrant rejection of the second grand
jury vote. 33

28. Id. Furthermore, in People v. Martin, 71 A.D.2d 928, 419 N.Y.S.2d

724 (2d Dep't 1979), the Appellate Division, Second Department, stated that
the purpose of CPL § 190.75(3) is to "protect a potential defendant by
preventing the District Attorney from resubmitting a matter more than once
and by requiring him to obtain permission from the court to resubmit." Id. at
929, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 725-26. Moreover, the court reasoned that since "the
prosecutor is still required to make an application to the court shows that his
dissatisfaction with the first [g]rand [j]ury's action is not in itself sufficient
reason to permit resubmission." Id. at 929, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 726.
29. Jones, 206 A.D.2d at 85-86, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 322.
30. 86 A.D.2d 191, 449 N.Y.S.2d 284 (2d Dep't 1982). The defendant

was charged with first degree assault and fourth degree criminal possession of
a weapon. Id. at 193, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 286. Following a grand jury

proceeding, the grand jury refused to indict. Id. The trial court then granted
the prosecutor's request of resubmission based on his claim that the first grand
jury vote was against the weight of the evidence. Id. The trial court denied the
defendant's writ of prohibition and the defendant was later indicted by the
second grand jury. Id.
31. Id. at 195, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 288.
32. Id. at 195, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 287.
33. Jones, 206 A.D.2d at 86, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 322.
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The Jones court utilized the above reasoning and stated that to
allow a prosecutor to continue with the first indictment after all
the charges were dropped in a subsequent proceeding is
"tantamount to allowing the resubmission of charges without any
legal basis... [which] would be in direct contravention of the
intent of CPL section 190.75(3) and compromise the authority
and integrity of the second [g]rand [[]ury. "34 The court reasoned
in the case at hand that to permit the trial court to proceed based
on the first indictment would undermine the function of the grand
jury to evaluate evidence and determine whether to indict an
35
individual charged with a crime.
The court in Jones went on to reject the People's contention
that CPL section 200.8036 provided a basis for rejecting the
second grand jury's vote. 37 The court stated that CPL

section 200.80 is applicable in situations only where both grand
juries considering the charges vote to indict. 3 8 The court
supposed that the statute was applicable to the defendant's
situation where the second indictment should have superseded the
first indictment. 39 The Jones court ultimately concluded that the
second grand jury vote constituted a legal impediment to the

34. Id.
35. Id. at 86-87, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 323.
36. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §200.80 (McKinney 1993). The statute
provides:
If at any time befbre entry of a plea of guilty to an indictment or
commencement of a trial thereof another indictment is filed in the same
court charging the defendant with an offense charged in the first
indictment, the first indictment is, with respect to such offense,
superseded by the second and, upon the defendant's arraignment upon
the second indictment, the count of the first indictment charging such
offense must be dismissed by the court The first indictment is not,
however, superseded with respect to any count contained therein which
charges an offense not charged in the second indictment. Nothing herein
precludes the filing of a superseding indictment when the first
accusatory instrument is a superior court infbrmation.
Id.
37. Jones, 206 A.D.2d at 87, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 323.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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defendant's prosecution; thus, the court reversed the conviction
40
of the defendant.
However, the majority opinion by the court did not stand
without dissent. Justice Sullivan, dissenting, disagreed as to the
application of the legislative intent set forth in Cade.4 1 The
dissent argued that the legislative purpose of CPL
sections 190.75(3) and 200.80 was intended to protect the
defendant i situations where there is a vote of "no true bill" and
a second indictment is filed on the same charges. 42 In a situation
where the same charges are being re-presented to a second grand
jury, the dissent indicated that the potential for abuse by the
43
prosecution, as maintained by the majority, is minimalized.
The dissent argued that there was no basis, in the instant case, for
prosecutorial abuse since the only purpose for the second grand
44
jury hearing was to add an additional count of burglary.
According to the dissent, CPL section 200.80 is a procedural
device that fails to indicate that the Legislature intended to
provide a second grand jury with the power to supersede a vote
by a prior grand jury and to dismiss the charges already voted on
by the first grand jury. 45
The dissent further attacked the majority's holding that was
based upon CPL section 210.20(1)(h). According to the dissent,
the majority sought support in CPL section 210.20(1)(1) because
they could not base their dismissal on any other statutory
grounds. 4 6 The dissent focused on CPL section 190.75(1)47 to
rebut the finding made by the majority and the Appellate
40. Id.
41. Id. at 91, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 325 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 90-91, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 325 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
43. Id. (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
44. Id. (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 92, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 326 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
46. Id. (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
47. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 190.75(1) (McKinney 1993). The statute
provides in pertinent part: "If upon a charge that a designated person
committed a crime, either (a) the evidence before the grand jury is not legally
sufficient to establish that such a person committed such a crime or any other
offense... it must dismiss the charge." Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol11/iss3/41

8

et al.: Grand Jury

19951

GRAND JURY

Division, Second Department, in Franco.48 Justice Sullivan
argued that CPL section 190.75(1) requires that, in order for
charges to be dismissed, a grand jury must find that the evidence
presented by the prosecution is insufficient to warrant an
indictment. 49 The dissent argued that, since the statute fails to
provide for dismissal of a pre-existing indictment, the trial court
properly denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. 50
The Appellate, Division, First Department did not consider
whether the defendant's claims were viable under the Federal
Constitution because the United States Supreme Court has ruled
that the standards set forth in the Fifth Amendment, 5 1 which
require that a person not be held for a capital or infamous crime
unless the charges are presented and an indictment results from a
grand jury proceeding, are not applicable to state courts. 52 In
Alexander v. Louisiana,53 the United States Supreme Court stated
that while it is true that the Due Process Clause ensures that
petitioner will receive a fair trial, "it does not require the States
to [follow] the Fifth Amendment's provision for presentment or
indictment by a [g]rand O]ury... the Court has never held that
federal concepts of a '[glrand [j]ury,' binding on the federal
courts under the Fifth Amendment, are obligatory [on] the
States. " 54
Therefore, although both the Federal and New York
Constitutions provide grand jury provisions when an individual is
charged with a crime, New York courts do not fall into the
confines of federal constitutional law since the provision is
inapplicable to the states.
48. Jones, 206 A.D.2d at 92-93, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 326-27 (Sullivan, J.,
dissenting).
49. Id. at 93, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 326-27 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
50. Id. (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
51. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment states in pertinent part:
"No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or othenise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury .... " Id.
52. People v. Iannone, 45 N.Y.2d 589, 593 n.3, 384 N.E.2d 656. 659
n.3, 412 N.Y.S.2d 110, 113 n.3 (1978).
53. 405 U.S. 625 (1972).
54. Id. at 633.
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